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Throughout American history, individual states have engaged in 
what scholars have aptly referred to as an ‘orgy of constitution-
making.’  States’ basic charters, however, have diverged 
profoundly from the federal Constitution in virtually every 
possible way but one:  no state has ever created a parliamentary 
system.  This Article asks why this is so, and finds that the 
answer reveals a basic American political pathology:  a hatred of 
parties and legislative processes grounded in the electorate’s 
mythic belief that the only thing preventing political consensus is 
either special interests or venal politicians.  The current political 
paralysis in Washington, and in state capitals, also derives from 
this myth—thus demonstrating that inquiring into the absence of 
American parliaments reveals basic flaws in our current political 
culture. 
 
Like all election years, 2008 saw its share of figures ripe for 
ridicule.  Perhaps the strangest might have been Montana’s 
Republican candidate for U.S. Senator, Bob Kelleher.  Now in his 
late 80’s, Kelleher won the nomination mainly due to the disarray 
of the state GOP and came with a history of positions usually not 
associated with Republicans, such as single-payer health care.1  But 
when journalists wanted to communicate just how wacky and 
crazy the octogenarian is, they pointed to his belief that the United 
States should adopt a parliamentary system.2  Of course, Kelleher 
himself seemed not to understand very well the political Everest he 
was climbing; acknowledging that shifting to a parliamentary 
system would require completely rewriting the U.S. Constitution, 
he retorted, “[a]nybody who can type as fast (as a reporter) can 
                                                     
1 See Bob Kelleher, ON THE ISSUES, 
http://www.ontheissues.org/senate/Bob_Kelleher.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 
2013). 
2  See, e.g., Jennifer McKee, Kelleher: Still Pushing For Parliament, BILLINGS 
GAZETTE (Sept. 28, 2008, 11:00 PM), http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-
regional/montana/kelleher-still-pushing-for-parliament/article_6a5127c7-7876-
5322-84bf-27b3441095d5.html (documenting Montana Senate candidate Bob 
Kelleher’s advocacy of American conversion to a parliamentary political system 
based on England’s example). 
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rewrite the Constitution in an hour.”3  Not surprisingly, powerful 
incumbent Senator Max Baucus won in a walkover.4 
Kelleher’s position, however, is worth far more than comic 
relief, especially in a contemporary U.S. political context that has 
descended into paralysis.  The polarization of America’s political 
parties has turned so extreme that any partisan division of the 
political branches threatens an immediate political and economic 
crisis.  And this dysfunction, in turn, has led many observers to 
wonder whether the Presidential system does in fact undermine 
American governance.  In the wake of the federal government’s 
near-default in the summer of 2011, scholars pointed out that now, 
only nations with parliamentary systems still have AAA bond 
ratings from Standard & Poor’s.5  Time’s Fareed Zakaria noted that 
something like the debt-ceiling debacle was impossible in a 
parliamentary system because it unifies the executive and 
legislature:  “If we’re in for another five years of this squabbling in 
the U.S., we are going to make presidential systems look pretty bad 
indeed.”6  He continued:  “It’s all very well to keep saying that we 
have the greatest system in the history of the world but against this 
background of dysfunction, it sounds a lot like thoughtless 
cheerleading.”7  But the United States hardly needed five years to 
make Presidentialism look bad:  divisions between a Republican 
House and a Democratic Senate and President led to another 
government shutdown in October 2013, as well as nearly causing a 
federal government default.  Presidential systems keep looking 
worse and worse. 
                                                     
3 Jennifer McKee, Switchover to Parliament not Elementary, BILLINGS GAZETTE 
(Aug. 31, 2008, 11:00 PM), http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/ 
montana/switchover-to-parliament-not-elementary/article_85aed7ed-a717-5af6-
9aaf-2c5d0f46e230.html. 
4 2008 Election Statistics, OFF. OF THE CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, 
http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/2008/2008Stat.htm#stateMT 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2013). 
5 Joshua Tucker, AAA Ratings and Regime Types, WASH. MONTHLY (Aug. 15, 
2011, 6:28 AM), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/ten-miles-square/2011/ 
08/aaa_ratings_and_regime_types031529.php. 
6 Fareed Zakaria, Does America Need a Prime Minister?, CNN (Aug. 17, 2011, 
12:27 PM), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/17/does-america-
need-a-prime-minister. 
7 Fareed Zakaria, Fareed’s Take: Prime Minister . . . of America?, CNN (Aug. 20, 
2011, 1:34 PM), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/20/fareeds-
take-does-america-need-a-prime-minister. 
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To be sure, replacing the federal Constitution with 
parliamentarism is close to impossible.  Throughout American 
history, however, states have uprooted their constitutions several 
times; indeed, drastic change defines state constitutional history.  
As I will detail below, states have changed their basic charters in 
just about every conceivable way but one:  instituting 
parliamentary democracy.  Given the ease with which states can 
and have changed their basic charters, and the radical ideas they 
have pursued in doing so, it makes one wonder why the most 
powerful alternative to the basic form of U.S. governance has never 
been tried. 
As I suggest in this Article, the answer to this question is more 
interesting and counterintuitive than one might suspect.  It is not 
about worship of the U.S. Constitution, xenophobia, or ignorance.  
Rather, it turns on the traditional American hatred for the idea of 
political parties and distrust of legislatures.  It thus points to 
political pathologies that endure through contemporary times. 
1. GROUND-CLEARING: TIMING AND EVIDENCE 
By ‘parliamentary democracy,’ I mean a governmental system 
in which the electorate chooses the Legislature, which then in turn 
chooses the Executive.  The Executive remains formally responsible 
to the Legislature and can be dismissed by it at virtually any time, 
a process generally known as a ‘vote of no-confidence.’  The 
Executive is usually considered to be ‘the Government,’ and its 
head is the ‘Prime Minister,’ ‘Premier,’ or some other country-
specific term such as ‘Chancellor’ (Germany), ‘Taoiseach’ (Ireland), 
‘Head of the Government’ (Israel), or ‘President of the Chamber of 
Deputies’ (Spain). 
I do not distinguish between various voting systems for 
electing the Legislature as long as the franchise is broad enough to 
consider the nation a ‘democracy.’  Great Britain uses individual 
districts in which the candidate with the highest number of votes is 
elected whether or not she has a majority, a system usually 
described as ‘first-past-the-post.’  Israel has no districts at all, and 
splits the 120 seats in the Knesset pro rata based upon vote totals as 
long as a party receives at least 2% of the national vote, a system 
often described as ‘pure list proportional representation.’8  
                                                     
8 For a fuller description of the Israeli electoral system, see The Electoral 
System in Israel, KNESSET, http://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_ 
mimshal_beh.htm  (last visited Oct. 21, 2013). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss1/5
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Germany and Japan operate under complex systems in which 
some seats are distributed through national vote totals and some 
seats are allocated by regional support, with Japan maintaining 
multimember districts.  Australian voters must list their ordinal 
preferences so that if their most-preferred candidate finishes last, 
their vote is allocated to their second choice, a process known as 
the Single Transferrable Vote.9  All these systems carry vast 
implications for the country’s politics, but all constitute 
‘parliamentary democracies.’ 
1.1. Locating the Problem In Time 
A few weeks before adopting the Declaration of Independence, 
the Second Continental Congress advised the individual colonies 
to start writing their own constitutions,10 and the states have been 
responding in orgiastic fashion ever since. 
The nineteenth century marked the apex of state constitutional 
experimentation.  The antebellum period was “an era of permanent 
constitutional revision” in the states,11 and “[d]uring the last half of 
the nineteenth century, when a concern for continuity dominated 
national constitutional theory, state constitution-making was 
epidemic.”12  In all, “[o]f those states that joined the Union from 
1800 to 1850, only two had not revised their constitutions by 
century’s end; altogether, ninety-four state constitutions were 
                                                     
9 For more information on the Australian Single Transferrable Vote System, 
see Proportional Representation Voting Systems of Australia’s Parliaments, ELECTRONIC 
COUNCIL OF AUSTL. & N.Z., http://www.eca.gov.au/systems/proportional/ (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2013). 
10 The precise date was May 10, 1776, upon a resolution moved by John 
Adams.  See The Resolutions and Recommendations of Congress, U. HOUS. DIGITAL 
HIST. PROJECT,  http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3& 
psid=3940 (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).  The Congress then resumed the 
consideration of the report from the committee of the whole, which agreed 
resolved:  
[t]hat it be recommended to the respective assemblies and conventions of 
the United Colonies, where no government sufficient to the exigencies of 
their affairs have been hitherto established, to adopt such government as 
shall, in the opinion of the representatives of the people, best conduce to 
the happiness and safety of their constituents in particular, and America 
in general.   
Id. 
11 DANIEL T. RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUTHS: KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
SINCE INDEPENDENCE 93 (1987). 
12 G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 94 (1998). 
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adopted during the nineteenth century.”13  The process continued 
through the Progressive Era, which saw “widespread state 
constitution making”14 and revealed “substantial interest in 
revising state constitutions and reforming amendment 
procedures.”15  The last third of the twentieth century also saw 
widespread state constitutional change, but the changes occurred 
in forums and were usually limited to deal with specific 
substantive issues.16 
So as between the Revolution and the First World War, where 
should we focus?  For the purposes of this project, the Gilded 
Age/Progressive Era nexus forms the most appropriate time, for 
two primary reasons.  First, while many states revised their 
constitutions during Reconstruction, for the most part this came in 
the wake of the Civil War and the attempts to re-enter the Union; it 
would not represent a way of thinking about government 
structure, but rather about slavery and race.  Second, before the 
Civil War era, quite literally there were no parliamentary 
democracies for Americans to emulate or learn from.  Great Britain 
only became a mass democracy with the Reform Bill of 1867;17 
while its 1832 predecessor carries the august name of the ‘Great 
Reform,’ that Act was concerned more about eliminating corrupt 
parliamentary districts than about extending the franchise.18  On 
the eve of the 1867 Act, less than twenty percent of British adult 
males could vote, and the system of the 1832 Act remained in 
control of the aristocracy.19  Similarly, France did not become a 
democratic republic until 1870–71; Italy was still consolidating 
itself around the same time; Germany remained firmly under the 
                                                     
13 Id. 
14 JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 10 (2006). 
15 Id. at 47–48. 
16 Id. at 10. 
17 See H.J. HANHAM, ELECTIONS AND PARTY MANAGEMENT: POLITICS IN THE TIME 
OF DISRAELI AND GLADSTONE, at xxiii (The Shoe String Press, Inc., 2d ed. 1978) 
(1959). 
18 See, e.g., LLEWELLYN WOODWARD, THE AGE OF REFORM, 1815–1870, at 78–81  
(1962) (noting that the government was more interested in reforming Parliament 
than establishing democracy). 
19 See HANHAM, supra note 17, at xxvi–xxvii (“The Reform Act of 1832 had 
called the new forces in English life into the parliamentary forum, but it had not 
decided what role they were to play.  Indeed, after satisfying the most pressing 
demands of their supporters, the reformers had deliberately preserved for the old 
aristocracy much more power and influence than its experience of government 
and prestige alone would have won it.”) 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss1/5
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control of a monarchy, albeit with a sort of limited Reichstag; and 
Canada did not establish its own parliament—with vague 
independent powers—until 1867.  Although (as will be noted 
below) state constitution-makers were hardly shy in 
recommending radical changes, it would be asking too much to 
expect them to develop a new form of democracy on their own. 
By the 1870’s and 1880’s, however, Americans could see robust 
parliamentary democracies all across Western Europe as well as 
through Canada and its provincial governments.  Britain’s Ballot 
Act of 1872 instituted the secret ballot (far in advance of the United 
States);20 both major parties attracted more than a million votes for 
the first time with the general election of 1874.21  It makes sense, 
then, to start at the time when parliamentarism could serve as a 
realistic option for American state constitution-makers. 
1.2.  Silence in the Chamber 
A reasonable reader might now expect a review of what state 
constitution-makers said about the problem.  This is indeed what 
the reasonable law professor expected to write when he began 
researching the topic.  Therein lies the problem.  Even the most 
punctilious reader will search in vain for discussions in 
conventions of whether parliamentary forms should be adopted.  
The most comprehensive study of state conventions has found just 
one during the period to be considered here:  a brief colloquy in the 
Massachusetts Convention of 1919.  Aside from that, there is 
nothing.  Not until the 1970’s did the issue raise its head again:  1) 
Illinois in 1976, when the proposal was dispatched with thirty 
seconds of debate; and 2) Montana in 1972, when the idea was 
advocated by—unsurprisingly—the indefatigable Kelleher, who 
gave an impassioned floor speech, was voted down, and left to 
nurse his wounds for another quarter century. 
2. EXPLORING HYPOTHESES 
In the absence of direct evidence, we might consider the 
indirect approach, namely, investigating the most plausible 
hypotheses and determining which one(s) seem to be the most 
                                                     
20 See Pontefract’s Secret Ballot Box, 1872, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
ahistoryoftheworld/objects/WryVwsknTr-aa4IQ-ID9iQ (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) 
(showing the first ballot box used in Great Britain, in 1872, and giving background 
on the Ballot Act). 
21 HANHAM, supra note 17, at xi. 
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plausible.  I consider 1) unconstitutionality, i.e., that instituting state-
level parliamentary systems would violate the United States 
Constitution; 2) tradition, i.e., that Americans were simply unable 
to recommend such a radical change from either the U.S. 
Constitution or their previous state charters; 3) ignorance, i.e., that 
Americans knew little or nothing about parliamentary government 
and thus could not be expected to imitate it; 4) conservatism, i.e., 
that Americans realized that parliamentary systems created a more 
activist government and rejected it for that reason; and 5) 
xenophobia, i.e., that Americans self-consciously rejected any 
European political system because of their distaste for European 
things in general and European politics in particular.  I find that 
none of these hypotheses can adequately explain American 
rejection of parliamentary system. 
2.1. Constitutional Disability 
The most obvious potential reason—that state parliamentary 
systems would violate the U.S. Constitution—is also the most 
easily dispatched. 
Quite literally, there is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that 
even suggests the illegitimacy of parliamentarism.  The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that federal separation of powers 
doctrine does not apply to the states.22  Even Michael Dorf, who 
claims that the “federal Constitution implicitly assumes that state 
governments will be structured along lines broadly similar to the 
federal government,”23 can do little better than to argue that the 
federal Constitution requires an entity called a state “legislature” 
and another that can be called a state “executive.”24  If that is all the 
federal Constitution requires, then we need not detain ourselves.  
A state-level parliamentary system could co-exist quite easily 
within the United States: if the federal Constitution required action 
by the “Legislature,” then Parliament as a whole would be the 
relevant actor, and if it called for action by the “Executive,” then it 
                                                     
22 See, e.g., Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educ. Equal League, 415 U.S. 605, 615 
(1974); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 
U.S. 71, 84 (1902). 
23 Michael C. Dorf, The Relevance of Federal Norms for State Separation of Powers, 
4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 51, 54–55 (1999). 
24 Id.  Dorf also insists that the federal Constitution requires ‘distinct’ 
legislative and executive bodies, but he does not claim that this ‘distinction’ 
would be violated by the Legislature choosing the Executive out of its own 
members. 
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would be the state-level Cabinet—although there might be 
litigation to determine whether it would be the state’s Prime 
Minister or the Cabinet as a whole.  Answering this Article’s 
question requires us to look elsewhere. 
2.2. Tradition 
In different guises, what we might call the Anatevka Principle 
would seem to be the favorite explanation.  Either Americans’ 
devotion to the U.S. Constitution, or general reluctance to tamper 
with its forms, would suffice to explain the dearth of parliamentary 
democracy. 
Such an account quickly flounders on the facts.  The love for 
the U.S. Constitution hardly prevented state constitution-makers 
from departing from it, often in very fundamental ways.  States 
tasked legislatures with appointing executive officers, or gave the 
job to Councils of Revision.25 Rejecting the federal Constitution’s 
provision that “the executive [p]ower shall be vested in a President 
of the United States . . . ,”26 most states opted for explicitly plural 
executives–a condition that still spawns litigation today.27  A few 
states even denied the veto power entirely to the Governor; others 
granted the Governor a line-item veto, which violates the federal 
separation-of-powers doctrine.28  The American Revolutionaries 
detested what they saw as Parliament’s “corruption” at the hands 
of the executive and forbade legislators from accepting executive 
appointments, but several states yawned at such a prospect and 
self-consciously allowed such co-mingling.29  Several states 
vigorously debated unicameralism, a few conventions put 
unicameral proposals on the ballot, and one–Nebraska—adopted 
it.30  Even those that did not often radically changed the 
                                                     
25 See Martin Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1770 
(1996) (noting that early state constitutions gave legislatures tasks currently 
thought to be executive and vice-versa). 
26 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
27 See, e.g., People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, 29 Cal. 3d 150 (1981) 
(enjoining state attorney general from litigation against state agencies when he 
has previously represented them). 
28 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998) 
(“[P]rocedures authorized by the Line Item Veto Act are not authorized by the 
Constitution”). 
29 See Flaherty, supra note 25, at 1770. 
30 For debates surrounding bicameralism, see JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 137—83 (2006).  Nebraska’s provision may be 
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composition of their state senates to diverge from the U.S. 
Constitution’s territorial principle.  Most spectacularly (at least 
from a lawyer’s perspective), a supermajority of American states 
instituted the popular election of the judiciary.31  If this was fealty 
to the Constitution, it only failed to look like betrayal because the 
1860’s saw an actual one. 
2.3. Ignorance or Misunderstanding 
Perhaps the answer can be found in American parochialism:  
maybe Americans merely had little interest in events on the other 
side of the pond.  But this assumption can certainly be overstated; 
indeed, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, “much 
of the discussion of American constitutionalism took place in the 
dual context of Anglo-American comparisons;”32 indeed, “[f]or a 
full generation following 1885, fascination with Anglo-American 
constitutional comparisons ran high.”33 
Nor did these comparisons simply boil down to encomia 
concerning American superiority.  In 1861, Walter Bagehot 
famously criticized the American Constitution in general and the 
separation of powers in particular, a critique “that caused real 
reverberations in America.”34  A quarter century later, a young 
political scientist named Woodrow Wilson “quickly became a 
nationally prominent voice for political reform”35 by heretically 
denouncing the separation of powers as a “radical defect” in the 
                                                     
found at NEB. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1875) (“The legislative authority of the state shall 
be vested in a Legislature consisting of one chamber.”). 
31 See Caleb Neloson, A Re-evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the 
Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190 (1993) (“While 
every state that entered the Union before 1845 did so with an appointed judiciary, 
every state that entered between 1846 and 1912 provided for judicial elections.  In 
the more established states, furthermore, all but two of the sixteen constitutional 
conventions held between 1846 and 1860 called for the popular election of both 
inferior and appellate judges.  As the nation approached the Civil War, two of 
every three states elected their lower court judges, and three of every five states 
elected their Supreme Court.”) 
32 MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE 
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 181 (1986). 
33 Id. at 166. 
34 Id. at 159. 
35 DANIEL D. STID, THE PRESIDENT AS STATESMAN: WOODROW WILSON AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 6 (1998). 
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U.S. Constitution.36  Not everyone agreed with Wilson, of course, 
but that was the whole point:  his work spurred an important 
debate within American educated opinion. 
One who closely followed Wilson’s analysis was the Scottish 
scholar and legislator James Bryce, whose American Commonwealth 
appeared in 1888:  “For more than three decades his assessment of 
the U.S. Constitution would be cited as authoritative.”37  Bryce 
never called for Americans to adopt a parliamentary system, and 
went out of his way to honor the U.S. Constitution as a document 
appropriate for American conditions.38  But in The American 
Commonwealth Bryce presented an extensive comparison of the 
differences between presidential and parliamentary democracy.39  
After reading Bryce’s book, no one could fail to remain ignorant of 
the nature of parliamentarism. 
Indeed, many people did read Bryce’s book.  When The 
American Commonwealth appeared, “[l]engthy reviews in journals of 
opinion appeared every month throughout” that year.40  It was no 
surprise that so many Americans were interested in Bryce’s book, 
for he had probably consulted them when he was preparing it:  
The Scotsman relied for information and answers on conversations 
and “an incredibly extensive correspondence with a wide range of 
elite Americans in a dozen cities.”41  The work was popular enough 
that Bryce produced a second edition only six years later–not a 
typical occurrence for a more than 1,000 page tome. 
Bryce’s network of contacts and his book’s popularity gave him 
minor celebrity status, which His Majesty’s Government made sure 
to exploit.  When Britain’s government in 1907 wanted to send an 
Ambassador to the United States in order to maintain the Anglo-
American entente, it sent Bryce to fill the role.42  In 1915, when it 
wanted to bolster U.S. friendship after the outbreak of World War 
                                                     
36 WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 284 (1885). 
37 KAMMEN, supra note 32, at 165. 
38 See, e.g., JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 356–62 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund ed. 1995) (1910). 
39 Id. at 193–203. 
40 KAMMEN, supra note 32, at 165. 
41 David C. Hammack, Elite Perceptions of Power in the Cities of the United 
States, 1880-1900: The Evidence of James Bryce, Moisei Ostrogorski, and Their American 
Informants, 4 J. URB. HIST. 363, 365 (1978).  
42 EDMUND IONS, JAMES BRYCE AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1870-1922, at 203-41 
(1968). 
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I, it appointed Bryce to head the commission to investigate 
“German atrocities” in Belgium.43  Three years earlier, when 
several thousand members of the Pennsylvania Society attended a 
dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria to honor the 125th anniversary of the 
Constitution, the Society corralled Bryce, not an American, to give 
the principal address.44  The point is not that Bryce was a popular 
figure, but rather that educated Americans knew his book, and 
could not have been ignorant about parliamentarism. 
Did Americans think that Britain was still an actual functioning 
monarchy because of the Crown’s formal role in the system?  
Probably not:  Americans, at least educated ones, knew quite well 
that two mass political parties competed for favor among British 
voters, and that the electorate rendered the decision.  In 1867, 
Walter Bagehot had famously described the monarchy as a 
“theatrical show of society,” which is “commonly hidden like a 
mystery, and sometimes paraded as a pageant.”45  His insight 
quickly became commonplace.  By the Gilded Age, even a cursory 
observer would have understood the basically democratic 
character of British political institutions.  Wilson and Bryce made 
that very clear in their works, and contemporary newspaper 
reports did the same.46 
2.4.  Xenophobia 
Maybe hatred rather than ignorance explains the problem.  If 
Britain did something, then that was often good enough reason for 
America to avoid it.  Certainly the tradition of hatred of England 
had purchase in American politics.  Holding “the vision of Britain 
as an oppressive empire, bent on the conquest of the earth . . . [b]y 
the late 1880s, John Bull-baiting had become a common stock-in-
                                                     
43 The results of this investigation are usually referred to as the “Bryce 
Report,” and, unsurprisingly, concluded that German troops were guilty of 
repeated “outrages.”  JAMES BRYCE, THE BRYCE REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE 
ON ALLEGED GERMAN OUTRAGES (1915), available at http://www.firstworldwar. 
com/source/brycereport.htm. 
44 KAMMEN, supra note 32, at 165. 
45 WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 51, 70 (1867). 
46 See, e.g., Liberals Still Gaining: Mr. Gladstone’s Party Almost Sure of Success, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1880, at A1.  Of particular interest for current purposes is that 
the Times’ report of the Liberal victory was reported on the same page and in the 
same columns as election contests in the American states.  See, e.g., The Burdens of 
Office: Heavy Responsibilities of the Gladstone Government, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1880, 
at 2 (noting fierce interparty competition and pressure from constituents). 
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trade for Republican politicians” eager to maintain high tariffs.47  
But not for them alone.  Democrats reliant on Irish-American votes 
were always anxious to “twist the lion’s tail,” especially because 
their program of lowering tariffs seemed to comport with English 
free-trade ideology.48  Democrat Grover Cleveland’s overheated 
1896 response to British actions in Venezuela was designed to 
avoid accusations of Anglophilia.49 
But political antipathy hardly implied hatred for British 
institutions and statesmen.  British Prime Minister William E. 
Gladstone, notes Ernest May, was “idolized” by Americans.50  This 
was particularly true of the reformers who strongly backed 
constitutional revision:  for the reformer, observes Ari 
Hoogenboom, “John Stuart Mill was his philosopher and William 
E. Gladstone his ideal statesman.”51  While a schoolboy, Wilson 
had kept a portrait of the Grand Old Man above his desk and 
proclaimed him “the greatest statesman that ever lived.”52 
In any event, American suspicions of British policy never 
became anything close to general xenophobia.  Importantly, 
Americans generally maintained positive feelings for France, 
especially after the emergence in 1871 of the Third Republic (which 
adopted a parliamentary system).53  Americans wished that French 
politics might resemble American politics more closely and (in the 
wake of the Dreyfus affair) be less anti-Semitic.54  But even Franco-
American rivalry over the proposed Isthmian canal never yielded 
any sort of anti-French movement, in no small part because 
Americans appreciated the sturdiness of French Republicanism.55  
Only a few years after the Paris Commune, Americans had come to 
see France as a true republic.  By 1902, Secretary of War Elihu Root 
                                                     
47 MARK WAHLGREN SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES: GETTING, KEEPING, AND USING 
POWER IN GILDED AGE POLITICS 60-61 (2004). 
48 Id.  
49 Id. at 62. 
50 ERNEST R. MAY, AMERICAN IMPERIALISM: A SPECULATIVE ESSAY 143 (1968). 
51 ARI A. HOOGENBOOM, OUTLAWING THE SPOILS: A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL 
SERVICE REFORM MOVEMENT 1865-1883, at 21 (1961). 
52 RAY STANNARD BAKER, 1 WOODROW WILSON: LIFE AND LETTERS 57 (1927). 
53 The best general survey of U.S. attitudes towards France in this period, and 
indeed from the Revolution through the 1920’s, is found in ELIZABETH BRETT 
WHITE, AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE: FROM LAFAYETTE TO POINCARE (1927).  For 
summary of the pre-World War I Third Republic period, see id. at 208-34. 
54 Id. at 251-256  
55 Id. at 218-233.   
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noted that during the previous three decades France had “prov[ed] 
itself a most important, most significant stronghold of popular 
rights, of popular sovereignty and of hopes for the futures of the 
peoples of the earth.”56 
In short, then, there is little evidence of self-conscious, anti-
European American exceptionalism in the specific design of 
political institutions.  Regarding Europe, Americans had gripes, 
complaints, and conceits and biases—but they did not have 
hatreds.  They were not inclined to reject ideas simply because they 
were European. 
2.5.  Conservatism 
Perhaps the very reason why some prefer parliamentary 
government—its tendency toward activism—is why Americans 
rejected it.  In this sense, it is not so much that the separation of 
powers caused weaker government, but rather the American desire 
for it, instantiated through the separation of powers. 
This hypothesis also runs aground on the brute facts of 
American history.  Although the Gilded Age is often thought of as 
the age of laissez-faire, it was anything but, and certainly by the 
Progressive Era such tendencies had been extinguished.  Consider 
the wide and deep range of vigorous state action during the 
period:  state and municipal-owned utilities (“gas and water 
socialism”), food and drug laws, railroad regulations, workers’ 
compensation, state-level labor laws, forest conservation, antitrust 
laws, progressive taxation, and campaign finance laws.  Moreover, 
recall the agencies just at the federal level that emerged during the 
period:  the United States Geological Survey (1879),57 the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (1887), the Agriculture Department (1889), 
the Commerce and Labor Department (1903), the FDA (1906), the 
Bureau of Reclamation (1902), the Forest Service (1905), Federal 
Reserve (1913), and the FTC (1913).  
Reformers wanted stronger government.  For the most part, 
however, they insisted that it be done through the executive 
branch and ‘apolitical’ administrative agencies.  If anything, this 
explanation shows how much reformers went out of their way to 
avoid parliaments. 
                                                     
56 Id. at 230.  
57 See also WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN: JOHN 
WESLEY POWELL AND THE SECOND OPENING OF THE WEST (1952) (describing the 
1870’s and 1880’s as the era of “big government science”). 
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3. WHY HAVE PARLIAMENTS IN THE FIRST PLACE? 
If the preceding discussion appears to have boxed us into a 
corner, we might escape by reframing the inquiry.  On what 
grounds would potential constitution-makers choose a 
parliamentary over a presidential system?  Many of the most 
prominent state constitutional revisions had obvious (if not always 
persuasive) justifications:  the initiative to go around the corrupt 
legislature, or an elected judiciary for greater democratization.  So 
why have a parliamentary system?  One reason, alluded to above, 
would be government efficacy and efficiency:  because presidential 
systems multiply veto points, they make governmental action 
ponderous and difficult.  And one might argue that this was the 
reason why the Framers adopted it at the 1787 Convention.58  But 
whatever the merits of that argument, it cannot explain political 
behavior during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. 
The key attribute of a parliamentary system, however, begins 
to clarify the matter.  All parliamentary systems rely upon party 
cohesion to organize the government.59  Parliamentary systems 
cannot exist without parties and thus empower them.60  It stands to 
reason, then, that constitution-makers supportive of parties’ role in 
government would have favored parliamentary systems. 
To the extent that parliamentarism represents a party-based 
order, then the late nineteenth century would have been the ideal 
time for it to take its place in the constellation of American political 
                                                     
58 At least that is the standard argument, and it is credible and plausible, 
although hardly undeniable.  See, e.g., Immigr. & Naturalization Servs. v. Chadha, 
462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (“The choices we discern as having been made in the 
Constitutional Convention impose burdens on governmental processes that often 
seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but those hard choices were 
consciously made by men who had lived under a form of government that 
permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked. There is no support in the 
Constitution or decisions of this Court for the proposition that the 
cumbersomeness and delays often encountered in complying with explicit 
Constitutional standards may be avoided, either by the Congress or by the 
President.  With all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, 
we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the 
exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the 
Constitution.”) (citations omitted). 
59 See, e.g., Kevin Drum, Can America Survive Parliamentary Norms in a 
Presidential System?, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 14, 2013, 10:47 AM),  http://www. 
motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/10/can-america-survive-parliamentary-
norms-presidential-system (outlining in general terms how a parliamentary 
system works). 
60 Id. 
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ideas.  Post-Reconstruction America, observes Stephen Skowronek, 
signaled the triumph of “[t]he state of courts and parties.”61  After 
the Democratic resurgence in 1874, the Gilded Age saw fierce inter-
party competition, as Democrats and Republicans divided 
governmental control for all but six years from 1874 to 1896.  
Presidential majorities were also razor-thin, and in two 
Presidential elections, the electoral college and the popular vote 
split.62  Thus, notes Skowronek, 
[t]he nature of electoral competition in these years further 
extended the hegemony of party concerns over 
governmental operations.  More than ever before, the 
calculations of those in power were wedded to the 
imperatives of maintaining efficiency in state and local 
political machines and of forging a national coalition from 
these machines for presidential elections.63 
The dominance of parties was not simply an established 
political fact:  it was legitimized by prevailing political ideology.  
From the mid-1830’s, to the turn of the century, 
partisan ideas, commitments, and organization not only 
spread throughout the Union but, more critically, 
penetrated the system deeply and completely enough to 
become the mainstay of the political nation.  The ideological 
case for party became more dominant; it took on a different 
tone as well, less defensive, more assured and assertive, 
more celebratory.  Spokesmen made a sustained, 
unambiguous case that rarely wavered . . .  But there was 
much more going on than the expression of rhetoric.  
Building on the arguments made, powerful partisan 
                                                     
61 STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF 
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 39 (1982). 
62 In 1876, Democrat Samuel J. Tilden captured the popular vote, but 
Republican Rutherford B. Hayes triumphed in the electoral college under 
circumstances still debated to this day.  For a classic account of this election, see C. 
VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE END 
OF RECONSTRUCTION (1951) (providing insight into the 1876 Tilden election).  
Twelve years later, Republican Benjamin Harrison unseated incumbent 
Democratic President Grover Cleveland, even though Cleveland won the popular 
vote.  In 1892, Cleveland then defeated Harrison, becoming the only President in 
American history to serve non-consecutive terms.  
63 SKOWRONEK, supra note 61, at 39 (footnote omitted). 
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perspectives grew and, most critically, were adopted as the 
nation’s norm with important behavioral consequences.64 
Until the end of the 1850’s, notes Ronald Formisano, party 
organizations “established an unassailable command of the routine 
political life.”65 
What could be better, then, than a state-level parliamentary 
system, where patronage and spending were run through party 
organizations?  A parliamentary system would have allowed party 
organizations to keep a watchful eye on the Governor/Premier, 
enabling them to unseat him if he went off the reservation.  The 
mystery, then, deepens:  it would seem that the late nineteenth 
century would be just the time when party dominance would have 
led for a push for parliamentarism.  Why didn’t the dog bark? 
4. VILLAINS OF THE GILDED AGE:  LEGISLATURES AND PARTIES 
To answer this question, we must consider those states that 
rewrote their constitutions during the Gilded Age and the 
Progressive Era.  More specifically, we should look at those people 
and groups who pushed for constitutional revision.  This 
examination is less easy that one might first think:  although 
scholars have closely examined the nature of power in the late 
nineteenth century, they have rarely focused on the politics or 
intellectual theories behind state constitutional revisions.  At this 
stage, however, we can provide one generalization.  For the most 
part, reformers focused on two major and interrelated issues:  the 
corruption of the legislature and the destructive influence of 
parties. 
California’s 1878–79 Convention serves as a typical example.  
The movement for constitutional reform was led by what would 
eventually become the right wing of the Progressive movement, 
comprising small businessmen and educated (mostly Protestant) 
middle classes.  The reformers yearned principally “to recapture an 
older golden age of republican politics”66—one predating the 
partisan warfare that had begun in the mid-1830s:  “[t]he 
nostalgic—or alternatively, optimistic—evocation of a purer 
                                                     
64 JOEL H. SILBEY, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL NATION, 1838-1893, at 33-34 (1991). 
65 RONALD P. FORMISANO, THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL CULTURE: 
MASSACHUSETTS PARTIES, 1790S-1840S, at 23 (1983). 
66 Harry N. Scheiber, Race, Radicalism, and Reform: Historical Perspective on the 
1879 California Constitution, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 35, 39 (1989–90). 
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political order was often expressed in a harsh critical stance against 
the regular parties.”67  The editors of the Daily Alta California 
expressed the reformers’ tone, one with particular resonance for 
the question at hand: 
There is to be neither Republicanism nor Democracy, as 
party tenets, embodied in the instrument to be framed [by 
the convention], but Americanism, if we may so speak, in 
contradiction to French Communism, German Red 
Republicanism, or the still wilder agrarian notions which 
have recently been so loudly proclaimed even in this 
country among the less intelligent classes.68 
Thus, state constitutional reform advocates specifically strove 
to avoid European political forms, not out of xenophobia but rather 
because they bred strong parties, which at least in some 
circumstances bred radicalism.  In this ideological context, had 
anyone suggested moving to a parliamentary system, they would 
have been Red-baited into political irrelevance. 
The party machines got the message, essentially running slates 
of stealth candidates under fusion and “nonpartisan” tickets; party 
regulars distanced themselves from the machine in order to get 
elected—which they did, forming a majority of convention 
delegates.69 
New York’s 1895 Convention appealed to similar 
constituencies, although its origins diverged from California’s.  The 
state’s 1846 Constitution provided for an automatic referendum 
every twenty years to determine whether to hold a new 
constitutional convention.70  Led by antiparty advocates, in 1886 
the state’s voters “overwhelmingly approved” a new convention.71  
But since Republicans and Democrats blocked each other for seven 
years over delegate selection procedures, the plan remained 
dormant until the Democrats emerged victorious in the 1891 
                                                     
67 Id. at 40. 
68 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting What Is Needed Is a General Representation 
of All the Honest Classes, DAILY ALTA CAL., Apr. 18, 1878, at 1). 
69 RICHARD L. MCCORMICK, FROM REALIGNMENT TO REFORM: POLITICAL CHANGE 
IN NEW YORK STATE, 1893–1910, at 52–56 (1981). 
70 Id. at 52. 
71 Id. 
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elections and established procedures that they thought would be 
favorable to them.72 
To counter, the Republican machine nominated men 
“distinguished for their professional activities rather than for close 
association with the party organization,”73 although the GOP’s two 
most important delegates, lawyers Elihu Root and Joseph H. 
Choate, were in fact staunch Republicans dedicated to ensuring 
their party’s hegemony.74  Much to many people’s surprise, the 
Republicans triumphed in the 1893 election, and their convention 
delegates went to work, crafting provisions that appealed to 
independents concerned about corruption but actually tended to 
enhance Republican prospects.75 
And what would this new ‘American’ convention actually do 
to the state constitution?  One institutional reform dominated:  
reduce the power of the Legislature.  Although delegates to many 
state conventions were wary of making their states’ charters too 
long, “such concerns underwent a change with . . . a growing 
suspicion, if not outright distrust, of legislatures.”76  Specifically, 
“from California’s first convention in 1849 to the Western States’ 
conventions of the late 1880s, delegates recognized that one of the 
principal purposes of the constitutions they were drafting was the 
expression of limitations—substantive as well as procedural—on 
the powers of state legislatures.”77  Similarly, “[t]he ultimate thrust 
of constitutional revision after the Civil War was . . . ‘a grand 
design to reduce the field of state law and withhold from it every 
subject which it is not necessary to concede.’  New and revised 
constitutions in the 1870s substantially reduced legislative 
                                                     
72 Id. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. 
75 For example, many provisions ostensibly ensuring the integrity of the voter 
rolls made it very difficult to register urban immigrant voters, the backbone of the 
Democratic Party.  The Convention separated municipal elections from state ones, 
which made it easier for urban Republicans to divorce themselves from the state 
party attracting Democratic votes.  This supposed ‘nonpartisan’ reform garnered 
independent support for the GOP.  But another independent priority—stronger 
municipal home rule provisions—died in committee:  Republicans had little 
interest in giving predominantly Democratic cities more autonomy.  See id. at 53–
55. 
76 Christian G. Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: 
Preliminary Observations on State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century 
West, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 945, 967 (1994) (footnote omitted). 
77 Id. at 970. 
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authority.”78  The pattern continued through the Gilded Age, with 
some state conventions in the 1880s and 1890s enshrining 
regulatory commissions because they were thought to be more 
reflective of the popular will than legislatures.79  State conventions 
insisted on single-subject rules, which were vague enough to give 
judges wide latitude to strike down statutes.  By 1914, one 
academic commentator became so exasperated with repeated 
attempts to hamstring state lawmakers that he complained of a 
legislature so ‘hampered’ that it could not legislate.80 
Azariah Flagg was a New York barnburner whose fierce anti-
railroad campaign in Illinois was typical of the radicals who 
created mid-century Midwestern constitutional politics.  An 1873 
speech celebrating the radicals’ victory in getting a new Illinois 
Constitution approved three years earlier encapsulates succinctly 
how political issues relate to constitutional change: 
But if discussion does not convince, power must compel.  
This nation was not formed to be run by moneyed 
corporations.  My liberties and yours are not to be bartered and 
sold away by venal legislators; and the government of this 
state and nation must be in the interests of liberty and the 
people.  Our election of judges signified this, and the work 
when kept up must go on until legislatures, judges, and 
executive officers understand that there has been too much 
time and expense devoted to chartered capital and too little 
to promote the welfare of the people . . . And let no man be 
horrified when we propose to elect judges that stand by 
popular rights.81 
To be sure, there is a passing reference to “executive officers,” 
but it is obvious that the focus here is on legislatures and judges.  
This hatred for legislatures should hardly come as a surprise:  the 
                                                     
78 MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY AMERICA 112 (1977). 
79 See, e.g., JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW 
MAKERS 240-46 (1950). 
80 Orrin K. MacMurray, Some Tendencies in Constitution Making, 2 CAL. L. REV. 
201, 213 (1914).  See also id. (describing the current era as one of “[d]irect 
limitations upon legislative power”). 
81 See Alan Jones, Republicanism, Railroads, and Nineteenth Century Midwestern 
Constitutionalism, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND GOVERNMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION BEFORE THE NEW DEAL 239, 255-67 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard 
Dickman eds., 1989) (quoting a speech by Flagg addressing a convention of 
farmers in 1873) (emphasis added). 
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late nineteenth century served as the heyday of works such as 
Thomas M. Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, published in 1868 
and reprinted several times over the next thirty years, which 
attempted to rein in the power of government. 
But a closer look at the book’s title is instructive.  The title is, 
officially, A Treatise Upon the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest 
Upon The Legislative Power of the States of the American Union.82  It 
might seem odd to lump together a jurist like Cooley and a radical 
like Flagg, but this conflation only underscores the point:  
constitutional reformers could disagree vehemently with each 
other on particulars, but they all agreed on their desire to reduce 
the power of the legislature and curtail the influence of parties. 
As the Gilded Age gave way to the Progressive Era, reformers 
poured old wine in new bottles, which should come as little 
surprise since many of them were the same people or came from 
similar political pedigrees.83  Reformers had political parties 
squarely in their crosshairs.  For the Massachusetts Convention of 
1917-1919, the delegate selection rules ensured that party influence 
would be diminished as much as possible:  delegates were elected 
without identifying party labels, a major Progressive demand, and 
were placed on the ballot by petition instead of through a formal 
nomination process.84  Ohio’s new Constitution of 1912 banned 
party-nominating conventions, mandating that any future 
constitutional conventions or constitutional amendments be non-
partisan.85 
Once again, the Legislature came in for the brunt of the attacks.  
Now, however, reformers’ main weapon was the ‘initiative and 
referendum,’ perhaps the quintessential attack on the legislative 
process, as this method undermines the essential idea of 
representative democracy.  So omnipresent was this proposal that in 
                                                     
82 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE UPON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 
(1st ed. 1868). 
83 See, e.g., Michael E. McGerr, The Decline of Popular Politics: The American 
North, 1865-1928, at 151-53 (1986) (noting that early anti-partisan reformers 
became dominant among middle-class reform during the first decade of the 
twentieth century). 
84 See John Allen Hague, The Massachusetts Constitutional Convention: 1917-
1919. A Study of Dogmatism in an Age of Transition, 27 NEW ENG. Q. 147, 150 (1954) 
(describing the election procedures for the delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention of 1917). 
85 Ohio’s New Constitution, 24 GREEN BAG 506, 508 (1912). 
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Massachusetts the delegates spent fully one-third of its time 
debating it.86  And “in the sixteen years between 1902 and 1918, 
over two-fifths of the states then in the union adopted the 
initiative.”87 
We can see these political themes most clearly in the case of 
E.L. Godkin, founder of The Nation, editor of the New York Evening 
Post, and a man with “extraordinary influence on the opinions of 
the educated professional, and reforming classes.”88  William James 
is widely cited as stating, “To my generation . . . Godkin’s was 
certainly the towering influence in all thought concerning public 
affairs, and indirectly his influence has certainly been more 
pervasive than that of any other writer of the generation.”89  
Godkin was appalled at Flagg’s address quoted above, calling it 
“worthy of a Paris Communard,”90 but he shared with the radical a 
distrust for legislatures and an attempt at curing democracy with 
more democracy.  In particular, Godkin was enthused about state 
constitutional revision as a cure for what he saw as the legislative 
mess: 
[I] do not look for the improvement of democratic 
legislatures in quality within any moderate period.  What I 
believe democratic societies will do, in order to improve 
their government and make better provision for the 
protection of property and the preservation of order, is to 
restrict the power of these assemblies and shorten their 
sittings, and to use the referendum more freely for the 
production of really important laws.  I have very little 
doubt that, before many years elapse, the American people 
will get their government more largely from constitutional 
conventions, and will confine the legislatures within very 
narrow limits and make them meet at rare intervals.91 
                                                     
86 See Hague, supra note 84, at 150. 
87 RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN 
AMERICA 39 (2002). 
88 See ROBERT KELLEY, THE TRANSATLANTIC PERSUASION: THE LIBERAL-
DEMOCRATIC MIND IN THE AGE OF GLADSTONE 299 (1969). 
89 See id. 
90 See Jones, supra note 81, at 257. 
91 EDWIN LAWRENCE GODKIN, PROBLEMS OF MODERN DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL 
AND ECONOMIC ESSAYS 297-98 (1896). 
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“[T]he duty of the government,” he predicted, “will be 
confined to simply weighing and stamping.”92 
A prophet he was not.  But he did not strike out, either.  
Indeed, one could argue that he accurately predicted much of the 
future course of California constitutionalism:  the adoption of 
initiative and referendum, the use of these instruments to create 
the state’s fiscal constitution, and the voters’ reliance on them to 
protect their property. 
5. THE SILENCE OF THE BACKLASH 
If reformers hated parties and wanted to use the constitutional 
revision process to undercut them, one might well wonder why the 
leaders of party machines did not attempt an equal and opposite 
reaction, namely, using the constitutional revision process to 
strengthen parties and instituting parliamentary government.  As 
with everything else, we have no direct evidence, but a relatively 
straightforward answer appears.  Machine leaders had little to gain 
and much to fear from radically reforming a system that they 
already dominated.  They knew how to nominate and elect 
candidates, how to pull the levers of patronage, how to stuff ballot 
boxes, how to drive their workers to the polls, and how to stop 
their opponents from voting.  There is a reason, after all, why party 
organizations were called machines.  Under these circumstances, 
any party leader confronted with radical reform would simply 
laugh at the prospect.  In any event, machine leaders were not 
theoretically minded, to say the least. 
6. ANSWERING THE QUESTION 
In light of the forces pushing for constitutional revision, 
answering the question posed by the Article becomes relatively 
straightforward once we consider for a moment the fundamental 
nature of parliamentary systems.  In such systems, formally the 
legislature dominates the executive (usually referred to as the 
cabinet, or the government).  It can dismiss the executive if it 
wants, and if the executive’s initiatives fail, the government 
usually resigns or calls a new election to establish ‘confidence.’  
Informally, the legislature agrees on a government only through 
negotiations between parties.  Parties are crucial to parliamentary 
systems; without them, negotiations to establish a government 
                                                     
92 Id. at 298. 
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would rapidly come to resemble Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem.  
Even in those countries such as Great Britain and Canada, where 
coalitions are usually unnecessary, general elections are 
competitions between parties: the question turns on which party 
will gain enough seats in order to form a majority in the legislature 
and thus form the government.  Thus, state constitution makers 
never seriously entertained the possibility of establishing 
parliamentary government at the state level because doing so 
would have empowered precisely those two political institutions 
that they most distrusted and detested:  political parties and the 
legislative branch. 
The hatred of legislatures carried with it a potentially 
important irony, for one could argue that the rejection of 
parliamentarism empowers the legislative branch.  James Q. 
Wilson makes the argument most succinctly.  Congress, he 
observes, 
is extraordinarily powerful when compared to the 
parliaments of many European democracies.  Though a 
parliament can select the prime minister, often it can do 
little more: the British House of Commons, for example, 
cannot without the permission of the prime minister amend 
a bill, alter a budget, conduct a hearing, or render a service.  
More exactly, it can do some of these things over the 
objection of the prime minister, but in doing so brings 
down the government and forces a new election.  
Incumbent politicians look forward to new elections with 
about the same enthusiasm that children look forward to 
visiting the dentist.93 
Little wonder, then, notes Wilson, that “Senator Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan was scarcely exaggerating when he said that the United 
States is the only democratic government with a legislative 
branch.”94  On this reading, state constitutional reformers only 
succeeded in cutting their own ideological throats. 
But, although appealing and often true, we should not take this 
framework too far.  Even assuming that Wilson’s analysis is 
correct, it was by no means obvious in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  We may now casually accept as fact the 
                                                     
93 JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND 
WHY THEY DO IT 237–38 (1989).  
94 Id. at 238.  
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notion of prime ministerial dominance over the United Kingdom’s 
Parliament; at the time, the parliamentary system might have 
looked like constant intrigue, particularly if (as many reformers 
did) one followed Gladstone.  The Grand Old Man had two 
governments upended by Parliamentary intrigue, as Joseph 
Chamberlain split the Liberal Party over Home Rule in 1885,95 and 
nine years later, internal Cabinet politics forced Gladstone into 
retirement at age 85.96 
Moreover, Wilson’s framework might be questioned for 
selective evidence.  Perhaps Great Britain has settled into a 
comfortable pattern of prime ministerial dominance,97 but that is 
far from the case in other parliamentary countries.  Israel has long 
suffered under unstable coalitions, usually driven by small parties, 
which have arguably hamstrung the ability of its prime ministers 
in peace negotiations.  Constant parliamentary dissolutions became 
the hallmark of Weimar Germany (along with elections that 
returned parliaments unable to form stable governments).98  Nor 
does the British system of individual districts elected through the 
‘first-past-the-post’ rule solve the problem:  Indian voters have not 
returned a majority government in a quarter of a century, and 
Indian governance has suffered for years from the intricate and 
                                                     
95 See R.C.K. ENSOR, ENGLAND: 1870–1914, at 97–99 (1936) (explaining that the 
First Irish Home Bill resulted in an “alliance” between Irish nationalists and some 
liberals, with “dissentient liberals” and conservatives sitting on the other side). 
96 See id. at 211, 214–15 (noting that Cabinet’s failure to support Gladstone 
after the failure of the Second Irish Home Rule Bill helped to cause his 
resignation). 
97 Or perhaps not.  As this Article was being prepared, the 2010 British 
elections returned a hung Parliament, resulting in an unconventional (and often 
ideologically incompatible) coalition between the Conservatives and their junior 
partner, the Liberal Democrats.  See Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Deal: 
Full Text, THE GUARDIAN (May 12, 2010, 10:11 AM), http://www.theguardian. 
com/politics/2010/may/12/lib-dem-tory-deal-coalition (including text from the 
agreement that was created to “underpin . . . [the] coalition government” between 
the Tories and the Liberal Democrats following the 2010 British elections); Election 
2010: First Hung Parliament in UK for Decades, BBC NEWS (May 7, 2010, 11:29 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8667071.stm (reporting that no major political party 
succeeded in gaining a majority of the seats in Parliament).  
98 See GORDON A. CRAIG, GERMANY: 1866–1945, at 509–10 (1978) (“[B]etween 
February 1919 . . . and June 1928 . . . fifteen separate cabinets passed across the 
political stage, none performing for longer than eighteen months and several 
disappearing into the wings in less than three . . . . More and more, parliamentary 
politics came to resemble an endless cabinet crisis, with more time and energy 
expended on the task of filling the ministerial chairs than in governing the 
country.”).  
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fragile coalition deals necessary to form a government.  Apparently 
legislators in parliamentary system are not as powerless as some 
might think. 
In any event, the constitutional reformers—who would 
eventually become prominent in the Progressive movement—had 
their own views on how to combat legislative corruption:  a 
stronger executive, empowered by a professional civil service, 
which could rise above ‘partisanship.’ 
7. CONCLUSION 
So why should anyone care?  Is this any more than antiquarian 
interest?  To answer these questions, we might look at Senate 
Republican Leader Mitch McConnell. 
McConnell may not go down in history as a Lion of the Senate.  
At the start of the 111th Congress, however, he shrewdly assessed 
the nature of American public opinion and developed an inside-
Congress strategy: with only forty-one caucus members,99 he 
needed to maintain absolute Republican unity and refuse to 
compromise with either Congressional Democrats or the Obama 
White House.  Such a strategy, he argued to his fellow GOP 
Senators, would not only slow down the administration’s program 
but also deny it political legitimacy.100  Nowhere was this more 
critical than on the administration’s centerpiece legislation, health 
care reform: 
‘It was absolutely critical that everybody be together 
because if the proponents of the bill were able to say it was 
bipartisan, it tended to convey to the public that this is 
O.K., they must have figured it out,’ Mr. McConnell said 
about the health legislation in an interview, suggesting that 
even minimal Republican support could sway the public. 
‘It’s either bipartisan or it isn’t.’101 
                                                     
99 See Brian Beutler, All 41 Senate Republicans Oppose Financial Reform Bill, Say 
Will Lead to ‘Endless Taxpayer Bailouts,’ TALKING POINTS MEMO (Apr. 16, 2010, 6:07 
PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/all-41-senate-republicans-oppose-
financial-reform-bill-say-will-lead-to-endless-taxpayer-bailouts (indicating that 
there were 41 Republicans in the Senate in 2010).  
100 Carl Hulse & Adam Nagourney, Senate G.O.P. Leader Finds Weapon in 
Unity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/us/ 
politics/17mcconnell.html. 
101  Id. (emphasis added). 
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McConnell realized that for the American voter, calling 
something ‘bipartisan’ gives it a seal of approval.  ‘Bipartisan’ 
legislation means good legislation, something that has been 
‘figured out,’ as if it is a mathematical puzzle.102  ‘Partisan’ 
legislation, on the other hand, is bad, reflective of something 
extreme or illegitimate.  ‘Responsible party government’ in the 
American lexicon is something of an oxymoron.  That different 
people or groups might have genuine and sincere differences over 
the proper direction of public policy is something close to heresy. 
Such beliefs also account for the hatred of Americans for their 
legislatures.  Political scientists John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-
Morse used focus groups and voluminous survey data to show 
that people do not know much and do not care much about policy.  
Instead, they believe in broad goals for the country, and they think 
that political actors working in good faith could accomplish those 
goals with minimum disagreement if they wanted to.  Thus, they 
write: 
People believe that Americans all have the same basic 
goals, and they are consequently turned off by political 
debate and deal making that presuppose an absence of 
consensus.  People believe these activities would be 
unnecessary if decision makers were in tune with the 
(consensual) public interest rather than cacophonous 
special interests.103 
                                                     
102 Although McConnell is the most prominent practitioner of blocking 
bipartisanship, he is not the only one.  Indeed, avoiding bipartisanship is a 
bipartisan exercise.  When, in 2005, President Bush wanted to privatize Social 
Security, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi drew a hard, uncompromising line 
against Republican proposals.  Moving toward compromise, she argued: 
would have persuaded people that there must have been something 
wrong with Social Security that needed fixing.  She suggested that Dems 
[sic] should keep that message in mind as they prepare to do battle over 
Ryan’s Medicare proposals.  ‘We got criticized for it, but it was the most 
important thing,’ Pelosi said. ‘We couldn’t have our own proposal on 
Social Security because it would confuse the public.’ 
Greg Sargent, Pelosi: Dems Shouldn’t Take GOP’s Bait on Medicare, WASH. POST (Apr. 
6, 2011, 3:39 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-
line/post/pelosi-dems-shouldnt-take-gops-bait-on-medicare/2011/03/0/ 
AFFRhVqC_blog.html. 
103 JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: 
AMERICANS’ BELIEFS ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 7 (2002).  
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Such a political ideology makes it quite difficult to adequately 
or clearly frame policy choices for voters.  Political actors in just 
about any democratic system seek to cast blame on their political 
opponents, but it reaches a high art in the United States, and it 
acquires a surreal tone when each side accuses the other of not 
being sufficiently ‘bipartisan.’ 
The inability to adequately frame choices is not merely a matter 
of intellectual pique.  As this Article is being written, the United 
States is going through a series of fiscal and financial crises all 
brought about through dysfunctional governance.  As noted in the 
Introduction, the federal government shut down for sixteen days in 
October 2013 and nearly defaulted because of Republican refusals 
to lift the debt ceiling.104  This was a reprise of similar incidents in 
2011.  Minnesota, faced with the same sort of divided government, 
actually did shut down for a few weeks.105  California has also shut 
down several times over the past twenty years for the same 
reason.106  While the immediate cause of these trends lies in a sharp 
ideological divergence between the parties, a gulf precipitated by 
the sharp right turn of the Republican Party over the past few 
years, its broader cause stems from the inability of the electorate to 
make fundamental choices. 
Presidentialism at both the state and federal levels allows 
voters to do so and perhaps might even encourage them in the 
effort.  Asking about the absence of parliaments in the states, then, 
reveals more fundamental problems in voter behavior.  Even if 
true, of course, there is little point in cursing the darkness.  But 
                                                     
104 See Jonathan Weisman & Jeremy W. Peters, Government Shuts Down in 
Budget Impasse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/ 
01/us/politics/congress-shutdown-debate.html (discussing the causes of the 
shutdown); Obama Signs Bill Ending Shutdown, Raising Debt Limit, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 
17, 2013, 12:19 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-government-
shutdown-20131016,0,1118789.story (announcing that the federal government 
reopened after President Obama signed “an 11th-hour deal . . . to . . . pull the 
world’s biggest economy back from the brink of a historic debt default”).  
105 For a general background on the Minnesota government shutdown, see A 
Sign of Things to Come? ECONOMIST, Jul. 7, 2011, available at http://www. 
economist.com/node/18928883. 
106 Strictly speaking, of course, California’s repeated fiscal crises over the last 
twenty years have not always been caused by divided government.  But because 
the state’s constitution until last year required a two-thirds vote to pass a budget, 
a provision only true in two other states, and still requires two-thirds to raise 
taxes, it effectively creates divided government even within the legislative branch 
itself. I am thus on firm ground in including it as an example of the perils of 
divided government. 
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perhaps forcing democratic choices might make sense: if required 
to choose one party or the other, voters would be less inclined to 
demonstrate the tendencies that Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 
discuss.  If history is any indication, the process of state 
constitutional revision will proceed apace in the future: when the 
next opportunity arises, state constitution makers should bring a 
parliament to the United States. 
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